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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1985-1986-PART II

INSURANCE LAW
W. Shelby McKenzie and
H. Alston Johnson*

UNINSURED MOTORISTS

COVERAGE

Penalties
In MeDill v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,' the supreme court emphasized the responsibility of the insurer under uninsured motorists (UM)
coverage for timely payment of the undisputed amount of any claim.
Previously, in Hart v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2 the court recognized that
payment of a claim under UM coverage was governed by the penalty
provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes (La.R.S.) 22:658, which requires
insurers to pay claims within sixty days of receipt of satisfactory proof
of loss.3 The insured submits a satisfactory proof of loss, the Hart
decision further suggested, if the insured submits evidence to the insurer
establishing (1) that the owner or operator of the other vehicle involved
in the accident was uninsured or underinsured, (2) that he was at fault,
(3) that such fault gave rise to damages, and (4) the extent of those
4
damages.
In McDill, the court made the factual determination that there was
no reasonable issue of fact as to the first three elements of a satisfactory
proof of loss. With respect to the fourth element, there was a dispute
concerning the amount of damages, but the insured clearly was entitled
to some recovery under the UM policy. Under these circumstances, the
court held, the insurer must tender unconditionally a reasonable pay-
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475 So. 2d 1085 (La. 1985).
437 So. 2d 823 (La. 1983).
If a failure to pay timely is found to be "arbitrary,

capricious,

or without

probable cause," the insurer is liable for a penalty of an additional twelve per cent (12%),
plus reasonable attorney's fees. La. R.S. 22:658 (B) (Supp. 1986).
4. 437 So. 2d at 828.
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ment.5 The failure to tender the undisputed amount subjected the insurer
6
in McDill to penalties and attorney's fees.

Workers' Compensation
7
In the 1982 decision of Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,

the supreme court recognized that the UM insurer, like the tortfeasor,
is a third party under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Law against
whom the employer and his compensation carrier may assert their sta-

tutory right to reimbursement for benefits paid the injured worker.'
Johnson was decided on the UM insurer's exception of no cause of
action. Therefore, the insurance policy was not before the court. Williams

v. Thonn 9 is the first decision specifically to consider the validity of

the common provision found in UM policies which expressly excludes

reimbursement of workers' compensation benefits. The court held that
the exclusion was not valid because its effect would reduce the UM
coverage below the limits of liability mandated by statute. 0

Named Insured
In Baesler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.," the

named insured was injured while operating a company car assigned to
5. The court indicated that the insurer must tender an amount which is "a figure
over which reasonable minds could not differ." 475 So. 2d at 1091-92.
6. Without discussion, the supreme court reinstated the trial court award of a twelve
per cent penalty on the total amount, along with $40,000 in attorney's fees, which
apparently was fixed to correspond with the plaintiff's contingent fee contract with his
attorney.
7. 425 So. 2d 224 (La. 1982).
8. The Johnson decision did recognize one exception to the workers' compensation
insurer's subrogation right against the UM insurer. The compensation insurer cannot
recover out of UM coverage paid for by the employee, the court concluding that such
recovery would result in an indirect imposition of the cost of compensation upon the
employee which is prohibited by statute. 425 So. 2d at 228-29. For further discussion,
see S. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 118, in 15 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1986).
9. 487 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
10. UM coverage is mandated under the provisions of La. R.S. 22:1406 (D) (1978
& Supp. 1986). In dicta, the Williams decision also observed that policy language providing
credit against or a reduction of the limits of liability for amounts received by the insured
as workers' compensation benefits was not enforceable. A number of decisions have
reached this conclusion. Landry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 320 So. 2d 254 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1975); Monnier v. Lawrence, 467 So. 2d 35 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 472 So. 2d 37 (La. 1985); Gagnard v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Buckelew, 246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970). However,
the workers' compensation insurer is entitled to credit against future compensation liability
for amounts paid to the injured employee under the employer's UM coverage. Thomas
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 477 So. 2d 1171 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 488 So. 2d 181
(La. 1986).
11. 481 So. 2d 131 (La. 1986).
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him by his employer. The UM insurer of his personal auto denied
coverage on the ground that the policy definition of "insured automobile" excluded the vehicle "furnished for the regular use of the named
insured." Reversing a summary judgment in favor of the insurer, the
supreme court correctly held that the definition of insured automobile
was not relevant to coverage since there is no requirement that the
named insured be occupying the insured automobile at the time of the
accident. UM policies generally provide coverage for the named insured
and relatives (as defined in the policy) without any requirement that
they be occupying any particular vehicle or any vehicle at all. While
unnecessary to the decision, the court also observed that it would be
"difficult to agree" that the car was furnished for the employee's regular
use,' 2 or that an alleged exclusion for said circumstances would be
enforceable against the mandate of the UM statute. 3
Other UM Litigation
Mandatory coverage and waiver continue to be a fertile field for
litigation. The requirements of form and for execution of the waiver,
and to what extent, if any, the court may look behind the signed waiver
to ascertain whether the insured made an informed choice, are undergoing
jurisprudential development. 4 The UM statute has been applied to au-

12. The court referenced Nevels v. Hendrix, 367 So. 2d 33 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978),
which places a restrictive interpretation on exclusions for vehicles "furnished for the
regular use" of an insured. For further discussion of Nevels, see S. McKenzie & A.
Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 63, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986).
13. UM policy provisions purporting to exclude coverage for a named insured or
relative while occupying a particular vehicle generally have been struck down as contrary
to the mandatory provisions of La. R.S. 22:1406 (D) (1978 & Supp. 1986). For a discussion
of these decisions, see S. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 118,
at 245-46, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986).
14. In Cheadle v. Francois, 470 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), the court
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding that the validity of the
selection of lower limits involved disputed facts. The selection contained the signature
"Mr. and Mrs. Willie A. Francois." The court held that this signature required proof
of who actually signed the selection. A concurring opinion also suggested that the form
was not effective because it provided only for selection of the minimum limits.
In Rawson v. Jennings, 487 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), the husband signed
a written rejection of UM coverage when he initially purchased automobile liability
insurance. When the policy was renewed, the agent apparently added UM coverage with
minimal limits in an application signed by the wife. The court ruled that the insured was
entitled to UM limits equal to the liability limits, finding that the initial rejection was
vitiated by the subsequent change order instituting coverage. The subsequent selection of
lower limits was held ineffective, however, because the insured was not informed of the
statutory mandate of coverage equal to his bodily injury liability limits or the right to
select lower limits.
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tomobile lease agreements as well as liability policies. 5 In addition, the
questionable extension of the concept of solidarity to require a UM
insurer to share the award of damages with the liability insurer of an
16
adequately insured joint tortfeasor has continued.
AUTOMOBILE

LIABILITY INSURANCE

Permission
Automobile liability insurance coverage is often dependent upon
whether the operator had the permission to use the vehicle required
under the terms of the automobile policy. In Francois v. Ybarzabal,"
the supreme court correctly recognized that a policy requiring "permission" imposes a different standard from a policy requiring only "a
reasonable belief" that the operator had permission to use the vehicle.
When the policy requires "permission," then coverage exists only when

the operator has the express or implied permission of the insured. The
operator's subjective "reasonable belief" will not suffice. 8

15, In Tapia v. Ham, 480 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 484
So. 2d 138 (La. 1986), the plaintiffs rented a car from Wray Ford, Inc., a franchise
dealership of Ford Motor Company. There was a Rent-A-Car System agreement between
Ford and Wray under which Ford agreed to provide automobile liability insurance to
protect Ford, Wray and "any person ... renting or driving the vehicle." The rental
agreement between Wray and the plaintiff specified that liability insurance with 100/300
limits was provided "in accordance with the standard provisions of an automobile liability
insurance policy." Relying on Ashline v. Simon, 466 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 28 (La. 1985), the court concluded that both Wray and Ford
had agreed to provide automobile liability insurance and therefore the mandatory UM
coverage was applicable.
16. Perrilloux v. Bowser, 483 So. 2d 1135 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986) continued the
trend commenced by Farnsworth v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 442 So. 2d 1340 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 445 So. 2d 452 (La. 1984), of imposing a portion of
the personal injury tab on the UM insurer even though the accident was caused jointly
by the negligence of an adequately insured joint tortfeasor. In Perrilloux, the plaintiff
was injured as a result of the joint negligence of an Illinois Central Gulf Railroad employee
(40%) and Bowser (60%). Bowser was an uninsured motorist. The trial court cast the
railroad's insurer with the full amount of the judgment. Relying on Farnsworth, the
appellate court recast 40% to the railroad's insurer and 60% to the UM insurer of the
plaintiff. This judicially created anomaly which requires the injured plaintiff to pay a
portion of his liability award out of his own insurance coverage is criticized in McKenzie
& Johnson, Developments in the Law, 1984-85-Insurance, 46 La. L. Rev. 475, 479-80
(1986). See also, S. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 134, at 27980, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986).
17. 483 So. 2d 602 (La. 1986).
18. The Francois case arose out of an accident caused by an unlicensed minor who
was operating an automobile insured by Sentry and whose father owned an automobile
insured by State Farm under a policy providing coverage for operation of non-owned
automobiles. The Sentry policy provided coverage to anyone using the automobile with
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The standard of permission is dependent upon the policy language.
The Family Automobile Policy, which is the policy subject to scrutiny
in most of the current "permission" cases, provided different standards
for owned and non-owned automobiles. For the owned automobile,
there was no "permission" requirement for the named insured and
relatives (as defined in the policy), but other persons (often referred to
as "omnibus insureds") were covered only when their use of the owned
auto was with the permission of the named insured. On the other hand,
that policy form provided coverage to the named insured and relatives
for their liability arising out of the use of non-owned automobiles, if
their use was with the permission, or with a reasonable belief that they
had the permission, of the owner. 19 These standards were carried forth
in many of the simplified versions of the Family Automobile Policy,
although some companies relaxed the standard for owned automobiles
by requiring only a reasonable belief.
The Personal Auto Policy, which was drafted by the Insurance
Services Office to replace the Family Automobile Policy and which is
now widely used in Louisiana, has removed any permission requirement
from the definition of insured and instead has inserted an exclusion
which states that the policy does not provide liability coverage to any
person "using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that the person is
entitled to do so." That change has several important effects. First,
permission is no longer an element of coverage. Therefore, the burden
is shifted to the insurer to prove the applicability of its exclusion, i.e.,

the named insured's permission. State Farm's policy required that the minor operate the
non-owned car with a reasonable belief that he had the permission of the owner. The
supreme court held that the jury was improperly instructed that there would be coverage
under the Sentry policy if the minor had a "reasonable belief." The supreme court found
that the Sentry policy required the express or implied permission of the insured. It dismissed
the claim against Sentry upon the factual determination that the minor did not have such
express or implied permission.
The case involved an interesting collateral issue. Since it had found both policies
applicable and the Sentry policy to provide the primary coverage, the trial court had
awarded judgment against Sentry for its policy limits of $25,000.00 and had awarded the
remainder of the $1,880.57 in damages against State Farm's policy limits of 25/50. Because
the plaintiff had not appealed the judgment against State Farm, a majority of the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that it could not increase the award against State Farm even though
the judgment against Sentry as the primary insurer had been reversed.
19. The court in Francois made the following observation: "Louisiana has two jurisprudential standards for permission, depending on whether coverage of car or driver is
involved, i.e,, coverage which follows the car versus coverage which follows the driver."
483 So. 2d at 604, This statement is absolutely correct in the context of the two policies
under consideration by the court in Francois. The court's observation, however, should
not be used out of context. Actually, the standard for permission should depend entirely
upon policy language, not upon whether coverage of the car or the driver is involved.
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the absence of the requisite permission. 20 In addition, the more relaxed
"reasonable belief" standard is applicable to all covered vehicles. On
the other hand, while the Family Automobile Policy did not require
that a "relative" have permission to operate the owned automobile,
apparently the Personal Auto Policy requires at least a reasonable belief
on the part of all operators. The Business Auto Policy, the current
policy form used for automobile liability insurance for most commercial
enterprises, still retains permission as an element of coverage under its
omnibus clause. As with any insurance issue, it is extremely important
to study carefully the language of the particular policy in question.
Exclusion of Insured
Clarke v. Progressive American Insurance Co. 21 held invalid an
exclusion of coverage for bodily injury to an insured contained in a
surplus line automobile liability policy. Testimony established that admitted insurers were not permitted to use such an exclusion. The court
determined, as a matter of public policy and by implication from the
compulsory insurance law, 22 that the exclusion was contrary to express
and implied statutory policy. It distinguished cases holding enforceable
a similar exclusion contained in the personal liability coverage of some
homeowners' policies.
JudicialInterest
Most automobile liability policies, as well as other liability policies,
agree to pay judicial interest on the amount of the judgment from date
of entry of the judgment until payment of the policy limits. Dobson v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,23 emphasizes the consequences to the
insurer of failure to make a prompt tender of policy limits after judgment. A judgment in excess of $600,000 was rendered against the insured
with automobile liability limits of $5,000. The liability insurer was cast
for approximately $30,000 in judicial interest resulting from its six month
delay in paying its policy limits into the registry of the court after the
trial court judgment was rendered. 24

20. The insurer has the burden of proving the applicability of a coverage exclusion.
See, e.g., Nettles v. Evans, 303 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
21. 469 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
22. La. R.S. 32:861-865 (Supp. 1986).
23. 484 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
24. For further discussion of judicial interest see, S. McKenzie & A. Johnson, Insurance Law and Practice § 233, at 436-41, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986).
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Acceptance of Legal Subrogation Concept
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Naquin,25 the supreme court resolved the
conflict among the appellate circuits and firmly adopted the proposition
that legal subrogation of an insurer upon payment to its insured should
be the rule rather than the exception. Many of the arguments advanced
in an earlier discussion in this forum 26 were specifically approved.
The defendant Naquin had been hired to make certain roof repairs
to an apartment building owned by Aetna's insured. The job was not
completed in a timely fashion, and a number of tenants suffered water
damage as a result. The building itself was also damaged to some extent.
Naquin assured the building owner that he would take care of the
damages to the building itself, but refused responsibility for damages
incurred by the individual tenants.
The owner (Aetna's insured) then contacted Aetna about the tenants'
claims. Aetna paid $7,200 worth of these claims and sued Naquin to
recover that amount. The trial court awarded Aetna a judgment for the
amount claimed, and the fifth circuit court of appeal affirmed. 27 In
doing so, it joined the first and second circuits in recognizing legal
subrogation under these circumstances.
Naquin argued in the supreme court that since no evidence of a
conventional subrogation agreement was introduced into evidence, Aetna
had to rely upon the principle of legal subrogation; and that legal
subrogation could not occur because Aetna and Naquin were not "solidary obligors" to the tenants. The supreme court properly observed
that in the case usually cited for that proposition, the statement was
merely dicta. 2 Moreover, the requirement in the Civil Code is simply
that the payor owe the debt "with others or for others" and have
"recourse against those others as a result of the payment. ' 29 This
requirement certainly seems to fit the situation in Naquin.
Aetna owed the tenants reimbursement under the insurance contract
which it had issued to the owner, and Naquin owed the tenants reimbursement because of his negligence in carrying out the repairs. The
tenants are entitled to only one reimbursement for their loss; and if it
comes from the insurance contract, there would appear to be no reason
why the insurer who paid the loss should not be entitled to cast it over

25. 488 So. 2d 1950 (La. 1986).
26. Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-78 TermObligations, 39 La. L. Rev. 675 (1979).
27. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Naquin, 478 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
28. Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1829. The former article from which this article was derived
varied in language slightly, but not in substance.
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onto the wrongdoer. If the law is otherwise, the loss will rest with the
insured and in the premiums charged for that type of insurance, when
it should properly rest with the wrongdoer. The law should seek to
assign the loss to the wrongdoer unless there is good reason to reach
a contrary result.
The acceptance of this principle by the supreme court foreshadows
the application of the concept in a number of related factual situations,
not all of which will be so easily resolved. If, for example, an automobile
victim is injured by the negligence of a defendant and is reimbursed
for $50,000.00 in medical expenses under a personal health and accident
policy, we can rest assured that the defendant will continue to be denied
any reduction in the amount awarded in a tort action due to the existence
of a "collateral source" of reimbursement in that policy. But we may
see the development of a principle that the victim is also not entitled
to a recovery of those amounts expended by his health and accident
carrier-but the carrier is, by virtue of legal subrogation. The decision
in Naquin should produce some interesting and challenging questions in
the future.
HEALTH AND

ACCIDENT INSURANCE

Interaction Between Health Policy and Workers' Compensation
The decision on rehearing in Pinell v. Patterson Services, Inc.30 and
the closeness of the vote in the supreme court on both hearings amply
demonstrates the difficulties presented by the interaction between a group
health and accident policy based on employment and the workers' compensation remedies available to an injured worker.
Pan American Life had issued a group health and accident policy
to Patterson Services for the benefit of Patterson's employees. It contained a rather standard general limitation clause which would have
denied any coverage under the policy on account of injuries for which
the employee "has or had a right to compensation" under any workers'
compensation statute. In the case at hand, Pinell was injured during
the course of his employment and was paid benefits under a federal
compensation statute. At the same time, he instituted a tort action
against other defendants, seeking recovery for his injuries.
The Pan American policy also contained a coordination clause which
provided in essence that if the workers' compensation remedy of the
injured worker yielded a recovery of less than $200.00 per week, he
would be entitled to an amount under the-policy sufficient to bring him
to that level. The aggregate amount available under the policy, however,
was subject to a specific maximum of $7,800.00.

30.

491 So. 2d 637 (La. 1986).
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As it turned out, the compensation remedy brought Pinell more
than $200.00 per week, and thus no benefits were paid under the Pan
American policy. In due course, Pinell settled his tort action for a
relatively substantial sum; the compensation benefits paid to Pinell were
completely reimbursed out of the tort settlement, and there was a credit
for future compensation up to the amount of the tort judgment.
Once the settlement was effected, Pinell claimed a right to the
benefits under the Pan American policy. He contended that since the
benefits had been reimbursed out of his tort settlement, all the compensation had been "negated."
The trial court agreed with Pinell, ordering payment of the maximum
benefits under the health and accident policy. The appellate court reversed. 3' On original hearing, the supreme court reversed yet again,
siding with Pinell's position.3 2 But on rehearing, the supreme court took
the view of the appellate court, denying any rights under the policy.3"
The court properly reasoned that the right of Pinell to recover
compensation benefits was not in the least affected by the fact that he
had a tort remedy against a third person. The only result of negligence
by a third person was that Pinell had a remedy beyond compensation.
In addition, his employer had a right to reimbursement of the compensation paid, a right which would not exist if there were no negligence
or other fault in a third person outside the employment enterprise.
Though correct on these points and in its result, the court seemed to
ignore that Pinell had received compensation benefits. The reimbursement
which occurred served only to place the employer in the same position
it occupied prior to the injury. Pinell had received his entire "tort
recovery" for his injury-part in compensation and the remainder in
tort.
That the employer is entitled to reimbursement of the compensation
benefits paid is of no concern to a plaintiff such as Pinell. He receives
the same amount that he would have received if there were no compensation statute. The tortfeasor pays the same amount he would have
paid absent a compensation statute; he simply pays a part of it to the
employer rather than to the employee. There is no reason to require
payment under a health and accident policy written to be supplementary
to compensation remedies when, in fact, the employee has received the
full benefit of those compensation remedies. Any other decision would
unnecessarily increase the cost of such health and accident policies by
a factor based upon payment to employees beyond their statutory entitlement.

31.
32.
33.

Pinell v. Patterson Services, Inc., 468 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
Pinell v. Patterson Services, Inc., 481 So. 2d 594 (La. 1986).
Pinell, 491 So. 2d at 640.

